1.

Introduction
Liberalization of the markets and large-scale privatization programs are the main policies implemented worldwide over the last twenty years (Kole and Lehn, 1997) . Great challenges emerged then for state-owned companies that face the competitive markets: how to adopt contemporary structures and practices in order to compete effectively in the open-markets regime? State-owned companies constitute a diverse type of organization and economic form, and constitute a considerable player in the economic scene worldwide.
Indeed, according to the OECD (2004a), they represent up to 20% of GDP, approximately 10% of the employment, and around 40% of market capitalization in OECD countries. At the same time, debates on Corporate Governance (CG) of state-owned companies that are partially privatized are equally as important as those of private companies. However, the governance processes and management policies of state-owned companies have to take into account a number of political constraints. The intervention of government, through formal or "behind the scenes" processes, to impose on the management political objectives has a significant impact on the way the state-owned companies organize their business. Politicians have always a motive to pursue political goals, such as over-employment in state-owned corporations, even in fully competitive environments, causing significant inefficiencies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . It is worth noting that the OECD, recognizing that improving the governance is an important public policy objective, developed recently a set of voluntary guidelines on CG of state-owned companies (OECD, 2004a) .
The state plays a significant role in major Greek listed and nonlisted companies. The objective of this paper is twofold. First, to enrich the debate in this area and to contribute to the increasing body of literature by examining and analyzing the organizational and institutional changes taken place in the HTO, the state-controlled dominant telecommunication organization in Greece, which now is partially privatized. Second, to place the HTO's case within the international debate regarding the privatization of state-owned companies and the importance of CG mechanisms in place. It is claimed that CG reforms were the main instruments to gradually transform the company from a government-run monopoly to a competitive company pursuing shareholder value-oriented objectives. From 1996, the Greek state reduced its participation in HTO's share capital and an effort to establish an entrepreneurial and "shareholding" culture at the HTO began. At the same time, a series of actions for opening telecommunications market to competition and strengthening capital market initiated by the Greek government, under the EU pressure.
Given the size and the importance of the company, its restructuring was not an internal organizational issue only, but involved key outside actors, most important of which was the government. From a management-of-change point of view, the transformation process of a state-controlled organization, like the HTO, should be seen within its broader institutional context, focusing on a number of interdependences among the different stakeholders (e.g., Johnson et al., 2000; Tsoukas and Papoulias, 2005) . The transformation process of the company involved a high degree of complexity, difficulties and conflicts. It is claimed that at the early stages of the company's change process the adopted mechanisms are still fragile and significant backward steps may be occurred.
The paper is structured as follows. Part one is an introduction.
Part two provides some background about the CG framework in Greece and describes the evolution of CG of state-owned companies. The European experience of telecommunications' privatization and reform is presented in part three. The HTO case is presented in part four, where the evolution of CG mechanisms and organizational structures are analyzed, together with some critical points related to HTO's transformation process. Part five concludes by summarizing the main points of the paper and discussing interesting issues with potential implications for the partially privatized state-controlled companies.
2.
The evolution of CG of state-owned companies in Greece
Recent developments
Traditionally Greek companies were, and most of them still remain, family owned. However, the significant use of IPOs as means for raising capital in the late 1990's turned these companies from private-family owned to public listed companies, offered the first sign that the long lasting operating methods had to be reconsidered. The discussion on CG in Greece is focused mainly toward protecting individual and minority shareholders' interests that are practically cut off from the decision making process of the firm (Xanthakis et 4 Up to the early 1990's state-owned companies were expanded to create employment around election time. 5 The literature has emphasized inefficiencies associated to state governance via intervention on stateowned companies (e.g., Kornai, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995 It is worth mentioning, however, that the new law was only an element of a reform-agenda to change the broader institutional-cultural environment. In particular, the law was a part of a broader domestic agenda on "modernization" proclaimed by the government of Costas Simitis after 1996. The Maastricht Treaty fiscal criteria for joining the European Monetary Union and the eurozone put strong pressure on the government to achieve macroeconomic stability and nominal 7 Law on "Modernization of State-run Undertakings and Organizations and other provisions". 8 The OECD (2004a) guidelines on CG of state-owned enterprises state that the clear separation of regulation and ownership is regarded as good practice.
convergence. Furthermore, a structural reform programme included the privatization of state-owned companies, opening markets to competition, improving capital market transparency, and restructuring and simplifying administrative procedures. Privatizations were mainly driven by the need of the Greek government to attract investment capital, improve corporate efficiency, establish an entrepreneurial culture in state-owned companies, promote a "shareholding" culture among citizens, reduce public deficits and liberalize monopolistic markets, such as banking, telecommunications and energy 10 . The method of privatization used by the government was the public offering of shares in the stock exchange, adopting a gradualist strategy.
Privatization and reform in European telecoms
Telecommunications services in European countries have been , to privatize it in 1992 was 17 In office since 1981. 18 It is worth noting that the first action in favour of state interventionism was taken during the 1974-1981 period by the Conservative Government (New Democracy), which nationalized major companies, like Olympic Airways and the Commercial Bank of Greece. 19 The "Socialization Act" , which introduced by the Socialistic Government of Andreas Papandreou in the early 1980's, changed the governance of state-owned companies, by establishing the so-called goal of serving "the national interest and the social whole". Representatives of the government, employees and several social groups were entitled to participate in the management of state-owned companies in order to serve the goals of the "socialized" public utilities enterprises (Papoulias and Lioukas, 1995 21 HTO trade union (OME-OTE) is strong and influential within HTO and has consistently opposed the Greek State reducing its shareholding in HTO. 22 The Conservative Government lost its marginal majority of one vote when an MP decided to withdraw his support. The affiliated press related the event with an earlier Government decision to halt procurement negotiations with local suppliers so that the strategic investor could take the decision. The country was led to premature elections and the Socialists returned to power. 23 In 1996 Costas Simitis, the leader of the reformist and European movement within PASOK, was appointed to succeed Prime Minster Andreas Papandreou, who resigned due to ill health. 24 As of December 31, 2003. 25 The state-related Hellenic Exchangeable Finance holds 10.6%, while Hellenic Finance and DEKA SA (the privatization company of the Greek State) hold 2.8% and 0.017% respectively. In addition, in order to prepare for full competition, HTO designed a regional expansion strategy in the Southeastern Europe.
The company made certain investments in telephony operators in Serbia, Armenia, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (table 2) . However, a number of Southeastern companies had experienced many problems, like high inflation, currency fluctuations, devaluations of the local currencies, and armed conflict and civil strife. All these conditions affected adversely HTO's international investments and businesses, resulting in a decline value. It is worth mentioning that the company has now change its strategy and believes that direct investments in other telecom operators are not necessary in order to support its regional expansion. 29 Practically, HTO was fully aligned to the Greek Companies Law and didn't have anymore the obligation to follow the provisions of the 1996 law, exclusively designed for state-owned companies.
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